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Abstract
Devolution, as other types of decentralization (e.g. deconcentration, delegation, privatization), profoundly changes
governance relations in the health system. Devolution is meant to affect performance of the health system by
transferring responsibilities and authority to locally elected governments. The key question of this article is: what
does devolution mean for human resources for health in Mali?
This article assesses the key advantages and dilemmas associated with devolution such as responsiveness to local
needs, downward accountability and health worker retention. Challenges of politics and capacities are also
addressed in relation to human resources for health at the local level. Examples are derived from experiences in
Mali with a capacity development programme and from case studies of other countries. It is not research findings
that are presented, but highlights of key issues at stake aimed at inspiring the debate in Mali and elsewhere.
A first lesson from the discussion suggests that in the context of human resources for health, decentralization of
authority and resources is not the main issue. The challenge is to develop or strengthen accountability of those
who decide and act, whether they are local politicians, bureaucrats or community representatives. If
decentralization policies do not address public accountability, they will not fundamentally change human resource
management, quality and equity of staffing. A second lesson is that successful devolution requires innovations in
capacity development of all actors involved and in designing effective incentive measures. A final key conclusion is
that the topic of devolution policy and its effects on human resources for health, and vice versa, merit more
attention. A better understanding may lead to more appropriate policy designs and better preparation for the
actors involved in countries that are embarking on decentralization, as is the case in Mali.
Introduction
Key constraints to health service provision in rural Mali
are often linked to resource management, and in parti-
cular to the allocation and performance of available
human resources. In Mali, the ratio of qualified staff/
population is eight times higher in urban areas than in
rural health centres, in particular for midwives. In addi-
tion to geographical disparities, it is also observed that
medical personnel are is not always carrying out their
curative role but instead focus on administrative matters
[1]. In terms of the availability and quality of staff, rural
areas are underserved despite several initiatives to
reverse this trend (such as community financing, isola-
tion bonuses and other incentives) and NGO involve-
ment. Currently, the Ministry of Health (MoH) is
reviewing its human resources policy with the objective
of rationalizing and harmonizing human resources for
health.
One of the strategies of the Government of Mali is to
decentralize responsibilities for the management of local
health centres to local institutions. This is done through
two complementary approaches that both aim at increased
community involvement, strengthened autonomy and the
division of labour (subsidiarity) for increased efficiency.
This has been done through (1) delegation of management
of health centres to community health associations since
1990 and (2) the devolution of decision-making power to
locally elected governments since 2002. Both structures are
community-based, elected entities. A community health
association (association de santé communautaire)i s
responsible for the daily management and financing of
public primary health care clinics. The clinics have a desig-
nated catchment area defined by the number of people
living within a 5 to 15 km radius from the clinic. “Local
governments” (communes) in Mali are autonomous entities
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administrative staff. They are different from the “local
administration” represented by the prefect. Mali has 703
local governments that have an average size of 20 000 inha-
bitants. The community health association and the local
government function as separate structures but representa-
tives from both organizations form the commune health
commission that discusses health programmes.
The recent devolution policy implies a transfer of
human resources at the primary healthcare level from
civil service to local government service, whereby local
governments contract local health staff and pay salaries
and incentives. Training and performance monitoring
remain central tasks of District Health Management
Teams (DHMT). In the education sector, this transfer
has already taken place; the health sector will embark
on this transfer in 2011. Currently, 30% of local health
staff is working for local government. This is expected
to increase progressively because of the establishment of
new health centres and the decentralization of vertical
priority programmes, such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculo-
sis control [1]. In the long term, all new staff will work
under the local government service.
The rationale for devolution policies in Mali is
straightforward but implementation is less so. Decentra-
lized management of human resources is a particularly
sensitive topic because it involves diverse political and
professional interests. The key questions debated today
in Mali relate to governance issues such as authority,
accountability and multi-stakeholder competition and
interaction.
Due to the relatively recent involvement of local gov-
ernments in health and a lack of evidence on what
works and what does not, discussions on devolution
become divisive debates where the arguments of both
sides, advocates and opponents, are often equally
unfounded.
In the context of this debate, not only in Mali but in
many other West African countries, this article will
examine the opportunities and pitfalls, real or potential,
of devolving human resources for health to the local
level. Recent experience in Mali is discussed together
with findings from studies done in other countries such
as Nigeria, Tanzania, China and Uganda. Although not
exhaustive, this article outlines the key issues at stake in
Mali and highlights lessons learned from other countries
in order to inspire the ongoing debate on devolution.
The article is based on a literature review and on
insights from a capacity development programme for
decentralized management of healthcare in Mali, in par-
ticular in the Koulikoro region. The Government of
Mali has been implementing this programme since
2004, in collaboration with the Royal Tropical Institute
(KIT), the Netherlands Development Organization
(SNV) and the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Mali.
Discussion
Decentralization and health services, what are we talking
about?
As in other countries, the Malian primary healthcare
package contains three groups of services: individual-
oriented curative services, preventive (outreach) services,
and promotional services. Typically local governments
are more directly involved in the latter two. In Mali,
local governments do not directly manage curative ser-
vices, but instead delegate management to community
health associations. While local governments may not
need all the necessary technical capacity themselves,
they should be able to participate in health planning
and decision-making, budgeting, management processes
and performance monitoring. In francophone countries,
this role is referred to as “maître d’ouvrage” (contracting
authority). Devolution should also be understood in this
sense. Regulation and quality assurance remain key tasks
of the Ministry of Health’s DHMT.
Devolution and human resources for health: four key
issues
Four key opportunities and dilemmas associated with
devolution and human resources for health (HRH) are
discussed below.
Responsiveness
Devolution, as well as reforms to improve community
participation and client voice, can promote a better fit
between services, local conditions and recipient
demands [2]. In terms of human resources, a case study
in Tanzania found that decentralized recruitment
resulted in a more realistic distribution of staff com-
pared to centralized recruitment, where the posting of
staff was less responsive to the specific needs of the dis-
tricts [3].
Local governments in Mali are responsible for local
development planning, including social services. They
collect statistical data and identify specific needs of the
communities through participatory planning methods
from village level upward. DHMT has always faced a
lack of data for planning and its’ staff affirm that acces-
sing basic information through local governments nar-
rows the gap between the identified needs and the
allocation of human resources. In addition, DHMT wel-
comes the initiatives of rural governments to recruit
temporary staff according to specific social, economic
and ecological conditions. These include the recruitment
of additional vaccinators during campaigns, malaria pre-
vention officers in the rainy season and outreach
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busy to travel to health centres.
Retention of health workers
Decentralization allows local governments to hire staff
from within the locality. In Mali, this has resulted in a
group of health workers who know their rural living
environment and who are less likely to leave for another
post. Local governments also offer benefits such as
housing or transportation or other incentives in kind.
However, these measures appear to be effective only
among the lower cadre, not among highly-skilled staff
such as medical doctors and nurses. Attracting and
retaining doctors and nurses is a major challenge that
decentralization policies have not yet been able to
resolve. One reason is that local governments and com-
munity health associations face fierce competition with
central government, which provides civil servant con-
tracts with better security and career perspectives. Con-
sequently, posts in remote areas are mainly used as a
bridge to government employment, preferably in more
urban areas. This challenge has been noted elsewhere in
decentralized systems such as those of the United
Republic of Tanzania and China where remote and
poorer districts could not compete for qualified staff
with central government or with richer local govern-
m e n t s ,r e s u l t i n gi na nu n e v e nq u a l i t yo fs e r v i c ep r o v i -
sion [3,4]. Kolehmainen-Aitken [5] further argues that,
unless equalization mechanisms are established, compe-
tition between poorer and richer local governments may
result in inequity in staffing. While the Government of
Tanzania opted for a recentralization of recruitment
procedures, Mali is currently strengthening decentra-
lized recruitment by harmonizing the status and
employee rights of different contracts and regulating
competition.
Downward accountability
Devolution represents the ultimate form of downward
accountability by elected local governments to local con-
stituents, and is seen as a way of motivating public pro-
viders to improve service delivery [6,7]. So far, evidence
on local government accountability is limited or partial,
and is mainly based on case studies. In Mali, individual
cases have been analysed but a more comprehensive
study has yet to be carried out.
After ten years of devolution in Mali, varying degrees
of local government accountability are appearing. Some
local governments function increasingly as intermedi-
aries between users and service providers. Communities
or individual users communicate their needs and com-
plaints with regard to the services offered to their
elected councillors, who in turn negotiate with providers
or the Ministry of Health to improve performance. Most
of these interactions are about the performance of
health workers. It is quite common for local authorities
to call into question the functioning of a health worker.
After investigation of complaints made by the local
population, corrective measures are identified, in colla-
boration with the health facility or through the Ministry
of Health.
Representatives of the Ministry of Health in Mali per-
ceive these local monitoring mechanisms as a benefit of
devolution. They resolve recurring issues such as staff
absences or attitudes, and issues are examined that were
difficult for the DMHT to monitor before decentraliza-
tion. The existence of an elected representative local
council can institutionalize the inclusion of client per-
spectives on quality in a more structured way. Similar
perceptions were observed in Uganda, where health staff
appreciated the human angle given to supervision, the
increased accountability and improved relationships
with key community members [8].
However, the decentralization policy itself seems to
undermine the emergence of accountability mechanisms
in Mali. Currently, responsibilities remain in the hands
of several institutions at a time, resulting in parallel
lines of accountability. This generates many conflicts
that affect health worker motivation. For example, the
government pays 1710 health workers on a special fund
f o rH i g h l yI n d e p t e dP o o rC ountries (HIPC), who are
contracted by local government and supervised by the
Ministry of Health at central level [9]. These workers
are accountable to different authorities and function in
a vacuum; many of them do not report for work. Simi-
l a r l y ,al o c a lg o v e r n m e n tm a yf i r eah e a l t hw o r k e r
recruited by the community health association, or the
Ministry of Health may remove a medical officer hired
by the local government. What remains of downward
accountability in this situation? Monitoring and collect-
ing information is one thing, but when it comes to mak-
ing decisions regarding recruitment, or performance
evaluations resulting in rewards or sanctions, the rela-
tions get more complicated. In other words, downward
accountability cannot be effective without functioning
horizontal accountability and upward accountability
relations between the different parties involved.
More complete and coherent accountability relations
require an alignment of health policies and decentraliza-
tion policies. In our view, this should be a policy priority
in Mali because the institutional confusion could demo-
tivate staff and exacerbate turnover, with serious conse-
quences for health outcomes. The opportunities
presented by downward accountability and formal and
informal mechanisms for participation should be seized,
but the right conditions are needed to make them work.
At the operational level, these conditions include the
capacities of actors to perform their new tasks under
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develop effective working relations.
Capacities
The lack of capacity of local government is a much-
d e b a t e di s s u e .A na r g u m e n ta gainst decentralization is
the lack of financial and human capacities of local insti-
tutions. An additional argument in the context of devo-
lution is the lack of political will on the part of elected
officials to invest in health and the risk of local elites
capturing and redistributing resources through patron-
age systems. However, in Latin America particularly,
some cases show that despite capacity constraints, many
interesting innovations in social services have been
introduced at the local level, rather than the national
level. Nelson [2] argues that investing in health is a
potential way of winning political support at the local
level, and political parties and citizens are more likely to
mobilize around social services at local level than at
national level. Key factors that determine priority-setting
in service provision are local leaders’ values and com-
mitment, the local party system, the social and eco-
nomic structure, and traditions.
In Mali, personal commitment of local leaders is also
a key determinant of the local government’sp e r f o r -
mance in health service delivery. However, without
capacity development, incentives and functioning
accountability mechanisms, their ability to deliver ser-
vices is limited. Below, we highlight a few innovations
that the Government of Mali has introduced to address
this.
Social capital
First, in terms of an enabling environment, it should be
noted that Mali has a rich experience in community-
based development approaches. This is demonstrated,
for example, by the early and partly effective implemen-
tation of the Bamako Initiative aimed at accelerating pri-
mary health care through community mobilization and
financing, and the introduction of locally-elected gov-
ernments from the bottom up. In particular at the
operational level, there is a high level of confidence in
local initiatives, in health as well as in other sectors.
The use and consolidation of “social capital” is essential
to operating a social system such as health, and particu-
larly important for decentralized management of health
services.
Capacity development
Second, the Government of Mali, in particular the
Decentralization Unit within the Ministry of Health,
with support from the partners mentioned above, has
invested strongly in capacity development of actors in
the decentralized system. Such programmes were miss-
ing in the cases of Tanzania and China, where the actors
involved were poorly prepared for decentralization,
undermining the efforts (Liu, 2006; Munga 2009). Three
key features of the capacity development programme in
Mali contribute to its succes s .F i r s t ,i th a sf o c u s e dn o t
only on the capacities of the “recipients” of responsibil-
ities (local governments) but also on those of the key
actors involved in the health system. Decentralization
implies a shift of responsibilities and relations between
different actors that include policy-makers, regulators,
providers, and users, and these need new skills to func-
tion and interact. The training programme included
modules for the different stakeholders. A second feature
of the capacity building programme is that, although it
has not yet become national policy, regional health
directorates have adopted it and included multi-actor
capacity strengthening in their annual programming.
And thirdly, the programme builds on existing instru-
ments (planning, supervision, peer review, maternal
audits) that are adapted to include participation of local
governments and community health associations. This
approach builds upon existing capacities, reduces costs
and enhances ownership.
Financial incentives
Another initiative that the Government of Mali has
introduced is financial incentive schemes that aim at
motivating service providers and enhancing their capa-
cities to deliver quality health services. The first
scheme was the introduction of performance-based
financing (PBF) at primary care level in 2010. The
main objective is to increase the quantity and quality
of health services through performance contracts
between local governments and health facilities. Perfor-
mance-based financing involves a process of joint per-
formance monitoring, planning, benchmarking and
contract negotiation, while roles, responsibilities and
accountability mechanisms are made explicit. The sec-
ond scheme concerns the contracting by local govern-
ments of DHMT to provide support services,
supervision and regulatory tasks; part of the contract is
for technical assistance by DHMT to local governments
in the area of human resources. This scheme is being
piloted and not yet evaluated. The third instrument is
part of the national development investment fund that
exists since 2006 and provides incentives to local gov-
ernments to improve service delivery. Local govern-
ments can access additional funds based on actual
improvements in key health indicators.
Through the three schemes, it is expected that health
worker motivation and performance will improve, along
with improvements in overall governance and account-
ability relations within the decentralized system. And in
cases where the legislation of devolution policies does
not provide sufficient clarity on the division of responsi-
bilities, the performance-based financing approach may
formalize responsibilities and enhance horizontal and
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effects of these schemes have not yet been assessed.
Politics and patronage
A final remark related to capacity is the issue of politics
and elite capture. It should be noted that decentralization
does not eliminate the politics of human resource man-
agement. It simply shifts politics from the national to the
local level or from the Ministry of Health to local govern-
ment. Local politicians and bureaucrats, like their
national counterparts, face similar obstacles and may
have only weak incentives to improve the functioning of
the system [2]. In Mali, patronage in the selection process
of health workers is common, whether the employer is a
local politician, a bureaucrat or a community health asso-
ciation. This has also been seen in other countries, for
example in China [4]. This means that the debate should
go beyond the risks of devolution to include a broader
view on governance in the health sector and more atten-
tion for the political economy of HRH.
Similarly, decentralization design should also take into
account political incentives and the potential effect of
patronage. Partial devolution can be counterproductive,
as observed by Khemani [7] in the case of Nigeria. Lim-
ited discretion (e.g. over staff recruitment, hiring, firing)
of the local institution generates demotivation, lack of
ownership and encourages corruption among local
authorities [7]. Continuous interference by central gov-
ernment in local HRH issues in Tanzania reduced the
autonomy of local authorities, which also reduced the
effectiveness of decentralized management [3]. Although
this has not yet been studied in Mali, the partial transfer
of responsibilities under devolution could have a similar
negative impact on the commitment of local authorities.
Conclusion
Decentralization reforms are complex and dynamic pro-
cesses and the outcomes for improved HRH are not yet
fully known, in particular in the context of francophone
West African countries that only recently established
locally elected authorities. But also in more advanced
decentralized systems, research on the effects or potential
of devolution on human resources for health at the local
level is limited. Measuring impact is further complicated
by the co-existence of different forms of decentralization
and the introduction of related health reforms.
The conclusions we can draw from this discussion is
that the question is not whether to decentralize or not.
The key issue to address is local accountability mechan-
isms. The redistribution of resources across actors and
government levels will not solve weak public account-
ability of decisions made that affect HRH. Political econ-
omy needs to be taken into account and additional
measures need to be put in place to provide incentives
for local governments, providers and regulators to make
the system work. A first step would be to harmonize
decentralization and health policies and clarify authority
and accountability relations.
Steps taken to support devolution in Mali, particularly
the introduction of the local government service for
health staff, the scaling up of a comprehensive capacity
development programme and the introduction of perfor-
mance-based financing, confirm the commitment of the
Malian government to strengthening the local manage-
ment of human resources. A preliminary assessment at
the operational level suggests that devolution offers con-
siderable opportunities for improving the responsiveness
of health services, staff recruitment and retention and
downward accountability. However, the partial transfer
of responsibilities to the local level, which results in
unbalanced accountability relations, seems to undermine
the opportunities created at the local level.
This article aims to contribute to the current debate
in Mali. However, providing concrete recommendations
for the way forward is impossible without a more sys-
tematic analysis of policies and their implementation.
The effects of decentralization on HRH at the local level
need to be closely monitored in order to collect more
evidence on what works and what does not.
Acknowledgements
This work was undertaken with the financial support of the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the authors were employed by The Royal
Tropical Institute (KIT) and the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV)
in Mali. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as KIT and SNV are
gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to thank key partners in Mali, in
particular the Ministry of Health, the Cellule d’Appui à la Décentralisation,
the Ministry of Territorial Administration and all the actors involved in the
SNV/KIT programme in Koulikoro region.
Author details
1Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), Amsterdam, Netherlands.
2SNV Netherlands
Development Organization, Bamako, Mali.
Authors’ contributions
EL and DD were involved in the preparation of this article, with EL focusing
on the literature review and outlining of the content and DD focusing on
collecting policy documents and examples from Mali. A joint analysis was
done with a few interviews with key stakeholder in Mali by both EL and DD.
The manuscript was drafted by EL and reviewed and complemented by DD.
Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 7 January 2011 Accepted: 8 June 2011 Published: 8 June 2011
References
1. Cellule de Planification et de Statistique (CPS), Ministère de la santé, Mali:
Développement des ressources humaines pour la santé: politique nationale
Bamako 2009.
2. Nelson JM: Democratic Politics and Pro-Poor Social Services: Unpacking
the Concept of “Reform”. In The politics of service delivery in democracies -
better access for the poor. Edited by: Devarajan S, Widlund I. Stockholm:
Expert Group on Development Issues (EGDI); 2007:25-42.
3. Munga MA, Songstad NG, Blystad A, Maestad O: The decentralization -
centralization dilemma: recruitment and distribution of health workers
Lodenstein and Dao Human Resources for Health 2011, 9:15
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/9/1/15
Page 5 of 6in remote districts of Tanzania. BMC International health and Human Rights
2009, 9:9.
4. Liu X, Martineau T, Chen L, Zhan S, Tang S: Does decentralisation improve
human resource management in the health sector? A case study from
China. Social Science & Medicine 2006, 63(7):1836-1845.
5. Kolehmainen-Aitken R: Decentralization’s impact on the health workforce:
Perspectives of managers, workers and national leaders. Human
Resources for Health 2004, 2:5.
6. Pinto R: Service delivery in Francophone West Africa: the challenge of
balancing deconcentration and decentralisation. Public Administration and
Development 2004, 24:263-275.
7. Khemani S: Local government accountability for health service delivery
in Nigeria. Journal of African Economies 2006, 15(2):285-312.
8. Ssengooba F, Rahman SA, Hongoro C, Rutebemberwa E, Mustafa A,
Kielmann T, McPake B: Health sector reforms and human resources for
health in Uganda and Bangladesh: mechanisms of effect. Human
Resources for Health 2007, 5(1):1-13.
9. Ministry of Health, Direction des finances et du materiel: Situation du
personnel sanitaire en 2009 Bamako 2009.
doi:10.1186/1478-4491-9-15
Cite this article as: Lodenstein and Dao: Devolution and human
resources in primary healthcare in rural Mali. Human Resources for Health
2011 9:15.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Lodenstein and Dao Human Resources for Health 2011, 9:15
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/9/1/15
Page 6 of 6